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Investment in information acquisition can be used strategically by banks as a commitment
device to augment market power. A static two-period economy with informationally heterogeneous
banks is analyzed. Information acquisition limits asymmetries of information and competitors’ rents
ex post. If projects yield insuﬃcient returns in the ﬁrst period, competitors’ ex ante break even
constraints are tightened, and competition inhibited. Market power can thereby be substantially
augmented, and monopoly rents obtained. Welfare is lower with information acquisition, while
banks are better oﬀ. With more than two banks, information acquisition is characterized by
strategic complementarities: hence, multiple equilibria may exist.
This article is based on a chapter from my doctoral dissertation submitted to Boston University. I am
grateful to Christophe Chamley, Jonathan Eaton, Simon Gilchrist, Hsueh-Ling Huynh, Albert Ma and espe-
cially Dilip Mookherjee for their invaluable guidance. I also thank Thomas Chemmanur, Claudio Gonzalez-
Vega, Debarshi Nandy, Philip Strahan and seminar participants at Boston and Ohio State Universities for
many helpful comments. All errors are mine alone.
1Information Acquisition and Market Power in Credit Markets
An important function of banking is to acquire information to separate creditworthy from non-
creditworthy borrowers. Indeed, credit risk is the primary ﬁnancial risk in the banking system
and selection and management of credit risk is critically important to bank performance over time
(Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 2001). Information acquisition facilitates the
identiﬁcation and rating of creditworthiness and is thus a critical feature of the banking industry.
Banks routinely invest signiﬁcant amounts of resources to collect information. Information
collection takes diﬀerent forms. Most institutions have large loan approval and underwriting de-
partments which evaluate applications. Evaluation takes the form of physical veriﬁcation, use of
statistical criteria and credit risk analysis software etc. Specialized brokers such as credit bureaus
and credit rating agencies also constitute a source of information about past behavior of potential
borrowers. Information can also be obtained through the process of lending; established relation-
ships can give incumbent lenders information about borrowers not necessarily available to all outside
players.
This paper analyzes information acquisition in the banking industry. The issue assumes impor-
tance because information gathering is a costly activity. There are substantial costs of operating
and upgrading loan approval and underwriting departments, and information brokers charge fees
to issue reports. Obtaining information through lending also imposes screening costs on banks.
As the theory of customer relationships argues, the incentive to acquire information is therefore
predicated on the ability to recover such costs through ex post rent appropriation.1 Rents can
arise endogenously through the process of lending. Lenders are usually not fully cognizant of all
relevant borrower characteristics ex ante.2 Relationships between banks and borrowers permit the
collection of proprietary information, which can mitigate ex ante costs through the use of ex post
market power. Market power arises because of the ‘lemons’ problem: the presence of inside infor-
mation with the incumbent implies that any applicant accepting an outside bank’s contract must
be of inferior quality. This forces up the price of outside oﬀers, allowing the insider to earn infor-
mation rents. The theory has received support from the recent empirical literature on loan pricing.
1See Greenbaum, Kanatas and Venezia (1989), Sharpe (1990), Petersen and Rajan (1995), Berger and Mester
(2002) etc.
2Information asymmetries and gaps have been identiﬁed as the deﬁning characteristics of credit markets. See
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) for a survey.
2D’Auria, Foglia and Reedtz (1999) and Kerr (2002) show that inside banks oﬀer credit at lower
interest rates due to informational superiority.
If loan products and the opportunity cost of funds are common across banks, the above line of
reasoning leads to the following conclusions. First, competition can dampen the incentive to acquire
information. Credit market competition can inﬂuence the leakage of proprietary information and
therefore erode the ability to exercise market power.3 Consequently, ﬁnancial market deregulation
can reduce the acquisition of information, as Allen et al (2001) have suggested.4 However, available
evidence does not seem to support this argument. Financial industries have seen a series of rapid
and interconnected competition enhancing technological, institutional and regulatory changes over
the last two decades.5 There does not seem to have been a concomitant decline in the information
gathering activity of banks.6
Second, banks will never have an incentive to expend resources to gather information on ﬁrms
which are seeking funds for project reﬁnancing. Suppose the loan approval departments of banks
can distinguish between ﬁrms seeking funds for new projects and those seeking funds for continuing
projects. For the latter category, previous lenders must possess information at least as good as that
possessed by outside banks. Therefore, if it is proﬁtable for an outside bank to oﬀer a loan to such
a ﬁr m ,i tm u s tb ep r o ﬁtable for a prior lender to do so as well. Competition then exhausts all rents
accruing to an outside lender, thereby removing any incentive to invest in information collection.
This conclusion is also at odds with available evidence: banks routinely receive applications for
project reﬁnancing and expend resources to investigate such applications.7
3Berger and Mester (2002) argue that deregulation in credit markets has been associated with an improved ability
to evaluate creditworthiness, thereby reducing incumbent lenders’ informational advantages.
4It has also been argued that some kind of oligopolistic industry structure may be required to preserve appropriate
incentives: see Anand and Galetovic (2000).
5Banks were the largest providers of credit to nonﬁnancial companies two decades ago. They were also relatively
protected from competition in local markets by virtue of restrictions on entry, price competition etc. The changing
competitive environment has reduced the importance of banks in the provision of credit. The removal of entry
restrictions has also increased competition amongst banks. See Bergstresser (2001) and Black and Strahan (2001).
6See Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (2000) and White (2001) for evidence that the information brokerage
industry has been growing steadily over the past decade or so.
7A possible resolution lies in the assumption that banks cannnot distinguish between ‘old’ ﬁrms and ‘new’ ﬁrms:
see Dell’Ariccia, Friedman and Marquez (1999), Dell’Ariccia (2001) and Marquez (2001). Since loan applications are
often carefully scrutnized by lenders, we discard this line of reasoning. We also rule out any role for liquidity shocks,
as large, persistent and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are seldom observed. In any case, a liquidity shock forcing
borrowers to seek outside ﬁnancing does not remove the adverse selection problem.
3This paper provides a resolution by arguing that information acquisition has strategic dimen-
sions. Information collection by any bank reduces ex post market power of other banks by limiting
informational asymmetries. In turn the erosion of ex post market power inhibits their ex ante
competitive ability. If banks are asymmetric in terms of their ability to acquire information ex
post, investment in information acquisition acts as a commitment device which augments market
power. The idea rests on public information being incomplete. Banks can then exploit their asym-
metric ability to gather private information to protect market power by strategically investing in
information acquisition. The argument lays a foundation for justifying acquisition of information
on ﬁrms seeking project reﬁnancing. It also shows that increased competition or the absence of an
oligopolistic market structure need not diminish incentives for investing in information acquisition.8
We analyze a stylized model to address these issues. We consider a static economy in which
projects last for two periods. Projects and borrowers are identical ex ante but are heterogeneous
ex post: some projects are unproductive in the second period, while the distribution of returns of
productive projects is dependent on borrower type. All projects yield insuﬃcient revenue (relative
to the cost of funds) in the ﬁrst period. A bank which lends to a borrower in period 1 learns
borrower and project type at the end of the period, while every non-lending bank obtains a signal
for such a borrower. Ex ante investment in information acquisition enhances signal quality. Finally,
banks are informationally heterogeneous: each bank has superior ex post observational ability for
some group of borrowers relative to all other banks.9
We fully characterize pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria of the model and show that such
equilibria always exist. Although there is aggregate symmetry across banks ex ante, symmetric
equilibria are not guaranteed to exist. Asymmetric equilibria can exist for intermediate costs of
information collection. Investing banks obtain monopoly rents ex ante, and have higher payoﬀs
than non-investing banks. Strategic commitment by the former group precludes investment by the
8Dinc (2000) argues that the impact of competition on bank incentives to commit to long-term relationships
with borrowers depends on whether competition arises from credit or bond markets. We focus purely on credit
market competition and show that the incentives to collect information can be preserved irrespective of the degree
of competition.
9Variation in informational expertise is a central feature of modern ﬁnancial markets. Banks can have asymmetric
access to outside information for a number of reasons: locational heterogeneity, past lending relationships, non-market
interactions, industry specialization, diﬀusion of personnel etc. The distributed location of banks in ‘information
space’ generates heterogeneity amongst lenders and gives rise to the possibility of ex ante market power. See also
Hauswald and Marquez (2002).
4latter.10 No bank invests if the cost of investment is high, or if investment is relatively unproductive
(in terms of improved signal quality), while all banks invest if the cost is low and investment is
suﬃciently productive.
The intuition behind a bank’s incentive to invest in information acquisition is as follows. Let
any bank j have observational superiority for some group of borrowers called its local borrowers.
Suppose j invests. At the end of period 1, it has a higher probability of receiving signals on
borrowers it did not lend to. Consider another bank k competing for one of j’s local borrowers in
period 1. Information collection by j reduces period 2 rents accruing to k from the relationship.
k has to break even over its lifetime from any loan oﬀer it makes to j’s local borrower in period
1. Thus, j’s investment forces k to raise period 1 interest rates on the loan oﬀer. Since period 1
returns are insuﬃcient to cover the cost of funds, there is an ex ante payment constraint. If the
payment constraint binds, k is no longer able to oﬀe ral o a ni np e r i o d1 ,a n ds oj obtains monopoly
rents. Therefore, if investment is suﬃciently productive, the incentive to acquire information is
generated provided the added monopoly payoﬀ outweighs the cost of investment.
The analysis further shows there may be strategic complementarities in information acquisition.
Investment by j tightens the ex ante payment constraints for all other banks l 6= j when they are
bidding for j’s borrowers in period 1. However, it also tightens other banks’ l 6= j,k ex ante payment
constraints when bidding for bank k’s borrowers in period 1. The existence of a spillover implies
that information collection may be characterized by strategic complementarities and therefore,
multiple equilibria could exist. We derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of
multiple symmetric equilibria.11 Interestingly, multiple equilibriac a n n o te x i s ti ft h e r ea r eo n l yt w o
banks in the economy. To see that, suppose j and k are the two banks. j’s investment tightens
k’s ex ante payment constraint when bidding for j’s borrowers in period 1. However, it does not
improve k’s position by tightening j’s ex ante payment constraint when bidding for k’s borrowers
in period 1. Therefore, no strategic complementarities are generated.
Focussing on symmetric equilibria, we ﬁnally show that welfare is lower if banks invest than if
they do not. This arises because we consider only the commitment value of information acquisition.
Investment then merely serves to augment market power of banks, and acts as a dead-weight
loss. Banks are better oﬀ when they collect information, while borrowers are worse oﬀ.S i n c e
10In the relevent zone of the parameter space, asymmetric equilibria arise as the resolution of a multi-player
‘hawk-dove’ game.
11Symmetric and asymmetric equilibria may coexist as well: see Proposition 2.
5information collection increases ex post competition amongst banks, we obtain the result that
investment increases the number of oﬀers received by borrowers seeking to reﬁnance projects, while
simultaneously reducing their lifetime payoﬀs.
Other authors have recently studied information acquisition in ﬁnancial markets. Boadway and
Sato (1999) study how information collected by one lender may dissipate to another through the
contracting process. Their analysis of the allocation of resources to diﬀerent kinds of information
collection shows that dissipation induces distortions and that government intervention through
information provision may increase welfare. Hauswald and Marquez (2002) study allocation dis-
tortions arising from increased competition. They show that intermediate competition leads to
a diminution of resources allocated to information acquisition while excess competition leads to
banks specializing in information acquisition in core at the expense of peripheral markets. By
contrast, we study the strategic role of information acquisition as a commitment device and the
complementarities associated with information collection.
This study is also related to literature on incentive problems in credit markets. Since lending
generates privileged information, banks get rents ex post from borrowers, thereby adversely aﬀecting
entrepreneurial incentives. Rajan (1992) and Padilla and Pagano (1997) apply results from the hold-
up literature to study how incentive problems may be mitigated. Rajan (1992) shows that ﬁrms may
borrow from multiple banks to induce competition amongst banks and thereby reduce informational
asymmetries. Closer to our paper, Padilla and Pagano (1997) argue that banks may commit to
sharing information ex ante to restore incentives.12 By contrast, we study costly information
gathering, rather than dynamic information sharing agreements. Our study complements theirs by
investigating information acquisition as a market power manipulation device, rather than examining
incentive issues.
The rest of the paper is as follows. The model is constructed in the Section 1. Section 2 analyzes
the model with only two banks, to develop the intuition. Section 3 presents a preliminary analysis
of the general model, while Section 4 characterizes equilibrium. Section 5 focusses on symmetric
equilibria, and also studies strategic complementarities. Section 6 concludes, and Section 7 contains
proofs.
12Pagano and Japelli (1993) show that information sharing may also arise in credit markets characterized by
extreme borrower mobility.
61M o d e l
The economy runs for two periods and consists of two types of risk-neutral decision makers: en-
trepreneurs (or borrowers)a n dbanks. I np e r i o d1 ,e a c hb o r r o w e ri se n d o w e dw i t ha ni n d i v i s i b l e
investment project which requires 1 unit of funds. Entrepreneurs have no resources and must bor-
row in order to operate the project. Projects can be of high (H) or low (L) quality. All projects
yield a cash ﬂow y in period 1. Period 1 output cannot be saved, so an entrepreneur needs to
borrow to operate the project in period 2. A project can be operated in period 2 only if it receives
funding in period 1. For simplicity, we assume al lb o r r o w e r sa p p l yf o rl o a n si ne v e r yp e r i o d .
L projects generate 0 cash ﬂow in period 2. H projects may succeed or fail in the second period.
In the event of failure, the output is 0. In the event of success, the cash ﬂow is Y> y .P r o j e c t
quality is realized at the end of period 1. The ex ante probability of an borrower possessing a high
quality project is s.
There is borrower heterogeneity, with the probability of success of a H p r o j e c ti np e r i o d2
depending on borrower type. The type space is a compact interval [i,i] on the real line and borrowers
are uniformly distributed over this space.13 A borrower of type i succeeds with probability σi ∈





2 . Like project quality, borrower ability is realized at the end of period 1.
There are N ≥ 2 banks, each with a local market. There is a continuum of borrowers, with the
total measure of borrowers equal to M. All borrowers in the economy are symmetrically distributed
across the local markets, with any given borrower belonging exclusively to a single market. The
measure of borrowers in any given local market is therefore M
N = µ. Banks engage in interest
rate competition for loans to borrowers. An entrepreneur can only borrow from a single bank in
any period. The model of competition between banks is asymmetric: each bank has informational
superiority over other banks as far as its local market is concerned (see below).14 Every bank
always knows the identity of any given borrower’s local bank.
A bank can obtain information about project quality and borrower type through the process of
lending. Consider a bank B and a borrower E.I fB lends to E in period 1, it perfectly observes
13Uniformity simpliﬁe st h ea n a l y s i sa n dh a sn oq u a l i t a t i v ei m p l i c a t i o n s .
14The idea is that local banks have incumbency or location advantages because of the informational distance
between local borrowers and the outside banks. For example, in a recent empirical study, Berger, Klapper and Udell
(2001) show that home banks persistently enjoy informational superiority over foreign banks for home borrowers.
7her type and the quality of her project at the end of the period.15 If B does not lend to E in
period 1, it receives a signal about her ability and project quality at the beginning of period 2.
Suppose E is not from B’s local market. Then the signal contains information only about her
project quality and never her type. However, if E is from B’s local market, the signal contains
information about her project quality as well as her type. This assumption is meant to capture
the stylized notion that information about projects can become public through some detection
mechanism, whereas information about borrowers themselves has a more local character and is
inherently more diﬃcult to obtain. The fundamental idea is that public information is incomplete,
while banks have diﬀerential ability to gather private information.
We assume each bank receives a signal for every borrower it does not lend to in period 1. Signals
for each borrower are independent across banks. The signal process is as follows. For a given bank,
conditional on a borrower not receiving a loan in period 1 or her project being of low quality, the
signal always yields L with probability 1. Conditional on her project being of high quality, the
signal is correct with some probability p, i.e.,y i e l d sH with probability p and L with probability
1 − p. For the local bank, the signal also always identiﬁes her type correctly.
p is therefore a measure of signal quality, or the accuracy of information received by a bank.
We assume that a bank can control the quality of the signals it receives through its investment
in information acquisition. Speciﬁcally, at the beginning of period 1 each bank has to choose
whether or not to invest in an information acquisition technology. We assume a discrete set-up
for simplicity, and note that extension to an environment with a continuous menu of technologies
is straightforward. Investment costs a ﬂat amount c and results in a signal quality pc ∈ (0,1).
Otherwise, the bank invests nothing and has signal quality pu =0 .16 Investment decisions are
publicly observable.17
Each bank has an unlimited supply of funds in every period at a constant opportunity cost
which is normalized to 0. To make the problem interesting, assume only single-period contracts
can be written or enforced. The following parameter restrictions are imposed: y ∈ (0,1),w i t h
15Inside banks are therefore assumed to be fully informed at the end of period 1. The results are robust to
perturbations of this assumption. The reason is that even if inside banks have imperfect information at the end of
period 1, the adverse selection problem remains as long as its information is superior to those of outside banks.
16Qualitative results are hold for pu <p c.P u t t i n gpu =0simpliﬁes the calculations.
17In order for information acquisition to have potential commitment value, we assume that resources are sunk
prior to period 1 decisions. The underlying idea behind the assumption is the observation that information collection
is typically a continuing process; banks need to monitor and analyze economic environments, industry trends and
market conditions on an ongoing basis in order to better scrutinize loan applications and evaluate creditworthiness.
81−y = α.18 Since the opportunity cost of funds is non-negative, if a borrower is discovered at the
end of period 1 to possess a low quality project, she will not be oﬀered a loan by her prior lending
bank in period 2. The net lifetime expected output from a project of unknown quality operated by
a borrower of type i is therefore s(βi − 1) − α. We assume any borrower’s project, conditional on
type, is ex ante eﬃcient. Therefore, we have
Assumption 1: s(β − 1) − α>0
We study pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria of the model above. Although there are two
periods, a number of events occur within each period. The following sequence lays out the exact
timing of events within each period.
Period 1:
1. Each borrower is endowed with a project.
2. Banks simultaneously make investment decisions.
3. They simultaneously decide on contract oﬀers for outside borrowers.
4. Then, taking current and future outside contracts as given, they simultaneously decide on
contract oﬀers for borrowers in their local market.
5. Borrowers make acceptance or rejection decisions. Output is realized, information is revealed
and contracts are settled.
Period 2:
1. Banks receive a signal for all borrowers with whom they have had no prior lending relationship.
2. They then simultaneously decide on contract oﬀers for such borrowers.
18All projects are therefore assumed to lose money in the initial phase. The assumption is motivated by the stylized
notion that cash ﬂows are often meagre in the early phase of the project. High quality projects have long gestation
periods, with most cash ﬂows accruing later in the project lifespan.
93. Taking outside interest rates as given, they simultaneously decide on contract oﬀers for their
prior borrowers.
4. Borrowers make acceptance or rejection decisions. Output is realized, contracts are settled
and the game ends.
2 The model with two banks
To clarify the intuition, we ﬁrst analyze the model when N =2 . The discussion is extended in the
next section to the general model. Important diﬀerences are examined in the following sections.
2.1 Preliminaries
We use backward induction to solve the model. This subsection ﬁrst examines optimal decisions
and payoﬀ functions in the second period, taking period 1 actions as given. It then studies the ﬁrst
period game taking investment decisions as given. The results derived here are used to investigate
equilibrium in the economy.
Let j and k be the two banks. Consider a borrower E from j’s local market. Suppose j did
not lend to E in period 1. Suppose also j receives signal L from E at the beginning of period 2,
and that E is of type i. There are three mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities: (i) E did
not receive a loan in period 1, (ii) E received a loan in period 1 and has a L project, and (iii) E
received a loan in period 1 and has a H project.
In order for j to oﬀer E a loan, it has to ﬁrst assign probabilities to these three events. Let the
respective assessed probabilities be πa
n, πa
l and πa
h,w i t hπa
n +πa
l +πa
h =1 . Since the signal is L, πa
l
must be positive. Therefore, πa
h < 1. E can generate revenues only under the third event. At the
beginning of period 2, k knows E’s type as well as the quality of her project. j knows her type, but
does not know her project quality with certainty. j must therefore break even from any loan oﬀer










10Given rl, k can always retain E by oﬀering her a loan interest factor rl −  .A l s o ,k makes has
a positive net expected payoﬀ at that interest factor. On the other hand, k will never lend to E if
she has a L project. Then if j oﬀers E a loan at interest factor rl, k will retain her if she has a
H project, and release her if she has a L project. Thus, if j oﬀers a contract to a borrower who
generates signal L, it will attract her either if she received a loan in period 1 and has a L project,
or if she did not receive a loan in period 1 at all. Either way, it cannot break even and therefore
will not oﬀer her a loan, due to adverse selection.
Now suppose E is not from j’s local market. Suppose j did not lend to E in period 1, and
that it receives signal L from E at the beginning of period 2. Extending the above argument, it
is obvious that j cannot break even on such a borrower if it oﬀe r sh e ral o a ni np e r i o d2 ,a n dw i l l
therefore not oﬀer her a loan.
Borrowers who did not receive a loan in period 1 will always generate the signal L,a sw i l l
borrowers who received a loan in period 1, and have L projects. Obviously, the latter category will
n o tb eo ﬀered a loan in period 2 by their prior lending bank. However, consider a borrower who
received a loan in period 1 and has a H project. She will always be oﬀered a loan in period 2 by
her prior lending bank. Will she receive outside contract oﬀers? The analysis above establishes the
following result:
Claim 1 Consider a borrower who received a loan in period 1 and has a H project. If all non-
lending banks receive the signal L from her, she does not get an outside contract oﬀer in period
2.
Now suppose a borrower of type i receives an outside loan oﬀer in period 2. Let r be the interest
factor on the outside oﬀer. If the outside oﬀer is received from her local bank, clearly the interest
factor equals 1
σi. Otherwise, let r satisfy feasibility, i.e., r ≤ Y , and consistency, i.e., r ≥ 1
σi,f o r
any type i receiving a loan in period 1.
Converse to the claim above, if the non-lending bank receives signal H for a borrower at the
beginning of period 2, she will receive an outside contract oﬀer. However, the terms of the oﬀer
will depend on the identity of the oﬀering bank. Consider borrower E of type i who received a loan
in period 1, and has a H project. Let j be E’s local bank. There are two possibilities: either E
received a loan in 1 from j, or she received a loan from k.
11We now derive the expected payoﬀs in period 2 to banks and borrowers under these alternative
events. Suppose a borrower received a loan in period 1. If she has a L project, her lending bank
will not oﬀer her a loan in period 2. Moreover, non-lending banks receive signal L. Therefore, she
will not get an outside contract oﬀer. Since a borrower who did not receive a loan in period 1 will
always generate signal L, she will not receive a loan in period 2 either. Focus therefore on borrowers
w h or e c e i v e dal o a ni np e r i o d1a n dh a v eH projects. What are the period 2 payoﬀsa c c r u i n gt o
such a borrower and her lending bank from the relationship? Assume she accepts the contract from
her lending bank in the event of indiﬀerence and let pl,l= j,k be the signal strength of bank l.
First suppose E receives a loan from j in period 1. Any outside oﬀer she receives in period 2
carries an interest factor r. The probability she receives an outside oﬀer in period 2 is pk. j has
superior information about E. Therefore, if k, conditional on receiving signal H,o ﬀers E al o a na t
interest factor r, j can always match it. In such an event, the respective payoﬀso fE and j are
(1 − σi).0+σi(Y − r)=βi − σir,a n d
(1 − σi).0+σir − 1=σir − 1
On the other hand, if E does not receive an outside oﬀer in period 2, j is a monopolist and can
extract all the rents from her, leaving her with 0 payoﬀ. The respective payoﬀs are therefore,
Pb
2,i(pj,p k)=pk(βi − σir) (1)
P
j
2,i(pj,p k)=pk(σir − 1) + (1 − pk)(βi − 1) (2)
Now suppose she receives a period 1 loan from k. With probability 1−pj, she does not receive
an outside oﬀer, in which case k is a monopolist and extracts all rents from her. Suppose she
receives an outside oﬀer from j (the probability of receiving such an oﬀer is pj). Since j makes her
an oﬀer if and only if it receives the signal H, k and j are then symmetrically informed about E.
Therefore, k must break even from lending to her, while she gets the entire net output from the
project. We have
12Pb
2,i(pj,p k)=pj(βi − 1) (3)
Pk
2,i(pj,p k)=( 1 − pj)(βi − 1) (4)
We now move to an analysis of the ﬁrst period. Consider a borrower E in bank j’s local market.
Neither her type nor the quality of her project are known at the beginning of period 1. Suppose
she receives a loan oﬀer from k, giving her a lifetime net expected payoﬀ v0. j then has the option
of oﬀering her a loan, taking v0 and r as given. Finally, E makes borrowing decisions based on her
available oﬀers. In the event of indiﬀerence, she accepts her local bank’s contract.
j and k are ex ante symmetrically informed about E, while has j an ex post observational
advantage over k.T h e r e f o r e ,k has to break even in expected terms from the contract it oﬀers E.
It is also possible that E does not receive any outside oﬀers at all, in which case her outside option
gives her payoﬀ 0. We ﬁrst analyze the game under the assumption that she receives an outside
oﬀer at the beginning of period 1. Later, we examine bank actions when local market borrowers
receive no outside oﬀers.
As before, let the signal quality of any bank l be pl.D e n o t e b y ρ0jk the interest factor on a
period 1 outside loan oﬀer from bank k to bank j’s borrowers. For convenience, we drop the letter
subscripts: the meaning should be clear from the context. Let k oﬀer E al o a ni np e r i o d1w i t h
an interest factor ρ0. Clearly, it has to be the case that ρ0 ≤ y.L e tE’s and k’s payoﬀsf r o mt h i s
contract be denoted as v0(ρ0;pj,p k) and u0(ρ0;pj,p k) respectively. Using (3) and (4), we have






=( y − ρ0)+spj(β − 1) (5)
u0(ρ0;pj,p k)=( ρ0 − 1) + s
Z σ
σ
(1 − pj)(βi − 1)
(σ − σ)
dσi
=( ρ0 − 1) + s(1 − pj)(β − 1) (6)
s is the probability of the project being H,a n dβ is the conditional expected gross output in
period 2. Now suppose j oﬀers E a loan contract with interest factor ρ.L e t E’s and j’s payoﬀs
from this contract be denoted as v(ρ) and u(ρ) respectively. From (1) and (2), we get






=( y − ρ)+spk(β − σr) (7)
u(ρ;pj,p k)=( ρ − 1) + s
Z σ
σ
pk(σir − 1) + (1 − pk)(βi − 1)
(σ − σ)
dσi
=( ρ − 1) + s{pk(σr − 1) + (1 − pk)(β − 1)} (8)
σ is the expected probability of success in period 2. Suppose ρ is designed to make E indiﬀerent
between the local and the best outside oﬀer, i.e., v(ρ)=v0(ρ0). j cannot oﬀer E ac o n t r a c tw h i c h
gives her less than v0(ρ0),w h i l eo ﬀering her a contract which gives her more is suboptimal. Using
(5) and (7), we have
(y − ρ)+spk(β − σr)=( y − ρ0)+spj(β − 1)
i.e., ρ(pj,p k)=ρ0(pj,p k) − s{pj(β − 1) + pk(β − σr)} (9)
Now, given any feasible outside contract oﬀered to E, j can always make a counteroﬀer to retain
E, provided it at least breaks even in the process. Since competition ensures that k must oﬀer E a
0p r o ﬁt contract, the contract must satisfy
ρ0(pj,p k)=1− s(1 − pj)(β − 1), by (6) (10)
E’s payoﬀ from this contract, i.e., her outside option is, using (5) and (10)
v0(pj,p k)=( y − 1) + s(1 − pj)(β − 1) + spj(β − 1)
or, v0(pj,p k)=s(β − 1) − α (11)
Given v0(pj,p k),i fj wants to retain her, it has to oﬀer her a contract ρ such that she is
indiﬀerent, where ρ is given by (9). Using (8) through (10), the local bank’s payoﬀ from a borrower
when the payoﬀ she receives from her best outside option is given by (11), can be obtained as
14u(pj,p k)=0 (12)
Competition therefore leaves the bank with 0 proﬁts. If its ex post observational advantage does
not prevent k from a oﬀering competitive contract ex ante, the borrower must get the entire net
expected output from the project. j is forced to match this payoﬀ, and therefore makes 0 proﬁts.
We now turn to an analysis of the behavior of a bank in the ﬁrst period when its local borrowers
have no outside oﬀers, i.e.,w h e nv0 =0 . The bank is then an eﬀective monopolist. Suppose the
bank oﬀers a local borrower a loan contract in period 1 with interest factor ρ. It is clear that ρ = y.











pk(σir − 1) + (1 − pk)(βi − 1)
(σ − σ)
dσi − α
u(pj,p k)=s{pk(σr − 1) + (1 − pk)(β − 1)} − α (14)
Since j is a monopolist in period 1, the borrower’s period 1 payoﬀ is 0. Provided she has a H
project, her lifetime net expected payoﬀ is given by (13) and is her expected payoﬀ in period 2,
provided she receives a period 1 loan from her local bank. The bank extracts all rents from the
borrower in period 1. Its lifetime net expected payoﬀ from her is then (y −1) in period 1, plus her
expected payoﬀ in period 2, conditional on the borrower having a H project.
Consider any bank l. Before describing equilibrium, deﬁne the indicator variable λl,w h i c ht a k e s
the value 1 if borrowers of bank l receive an outside loan oﬀer in period 1, and 0 otherwise. Also
deﬁne the set Il to be the set of types of local borrowers to whom bank l makes loan oﬀers in period
1. Symmetry implies that Ij = Ik in equilibrium. Since information is not available ex ante,e i t h e r
Il =[ i,i] or Il is null.
Suppose Il is not null. Consider the period 2 outside interest factor r. In equilibrium, borrowers
get period 1 loans from their local banks, if they get loans at all. If a borrower gets a period 1 loan
from an outside bank, it must be the case that lending to her is proﬁtable, given interest rates. But
15then, if an outside bank can make non-negative payoﬀs by lending to her, so can her local bank.
Therefore, rational expectations imply that the outside interest factor oﬀered by an uninformed
bank in period 2, conditional on receiving a signal H,i s1
σ. A larger interest factor would can be
undercut, while a smaller interest factor would result in negative payoﬀs, due to adverse selection.
The equilibrium interest factor thus satisﬁes feasibility and consistency, as deﬁned earlier. We now
investigate the determination of λl. The following result gives λl as a function of pj and pk.
Claim 2 Suppose Il is non-null. Given pj and pk, λl =1⇔ s(1 − pl)(β − 1) ≥ α.
Proof. See Section 7.
O u t s i d eb a n k sc a no n l ym a k eap e r i o d1o ﬀer if the interest rate on such an oﬀer is feasible.
Feasibility implies that the interest factor that allows the outside bank to break even must be less
than the ﬁrst period cash ﬂow. We see that whether λl,l= j,k equals 1 or 0 is determined entirely
by the parameters, pj and pk. We also see that if y ≥ 1, α ≤ 0, and hence λl is always 1, since
β>1.
2.2 Equilibrium
Equilibrium can now be deﬁned as a 2-vector (p∗
j,p ∗
k),w i t hp∗
l ∈ {0,p c}. There are two candidate
symmetric equilibria: one where neither bank invests in information collection, and one where
both invest in information collection. We call the former the U equilibrium, and the latter the C
equilibrium. There are also two candidate asymmetric equilibria: one where j invests, while k does
not, and another where k invests, while j does not. We call these the A equilibria. The banks are
symmetric ex ante. Therefore, whenever an equilibrium with j investing and k not investing exists,
so will an equilibrium with j not investing and k investing.
Under Assumption 1, a pure strategy equilibrium with lending always exists in the model. The
logic behind the existence of a U equilibrium is as follows. Suppose a bank does not acquire infor-
mation. The only reason it would deviate and acquire information is if it could force competitors to
stop oﬀering contracts to its local borrowers in period 1. If pc is low, ex post information dissipation
is low, and hence competitors are able to cover ex ante losses through ex post information rents.
The bank then has no incentive to invest in information acquisition.
16Now, by deviating, bank l raises its information collection ex post. It thereby reduces the rents
its competitor can earn ex post from l’s local borrowers. Hence the competitor has to charge a
higher interest ex ante in order to break even. If pc > 1 − α
s(β−1), deviation causes the ex ante
payment constraint to bind, and l earns monopoly rents on its local borrowers in period 1. Then
it has an incentive to deviate as long as the cost of investing is suﬃciently low. Therefore, a U
equilibrium exists for pc > 1 − α
s(β−1) as long as the cost of investment is high.
A similar argument shows that a C equilibrium exists if and only if pc > 1− α
s(β−1), provided the
cost of investment is suﬃciently low. Moreover, an asymmetric equilibrium exists for this parameter
range if the cost of investment is in the intermediate range. In an asymmetric equilibrium, the
investing bank makes monopoly rents ex ante, as the competitor cannot oﬀer its borrowers any
contracts in the ﬁrst period. It has no incentive to deviate in spite of the positive cost of investment
because the other bank is not investing which raises the rents it earns on its own local borrowers ex
post. The other bank makes 0 proﬁts however. Switching to an investment strategy is not proﬁtable
because c is suﬃciently high and because ex post rents on its borrowers are limited given that the
other bank is investing.19 Interestingly, the equilibrium payoﬀs and strategies are asymmetric in
spite of the two players being symmetric.
Asymmetry in banks’ ability to gather private information on mature borrowers can therefore
lead to the commitment value of information acquisition. This property arises because public
information, if available, is not fully revealing. Local banks have access to private information
ex post which allows them to credibly use information acquisition as a strategy to protect local
markets. Information acquisition, by generating rents, can therefore lead to a loss in social welfare,
a sd i s c u s s e di nS e c t i o n5 .
The following result completely characterizes pure strategy equilibria. In the discussion of
asymmetric equilibria below, assume without loss of generality that j invests, while k does not. We
have
Proposition 1 A pure strategy equilibrium always exists.
Suppose pc ≤ 1 − α
s(β−1). Then the unique equilibrium is the U equilibrium.
Otherwise, suppose pc > 1 − α
s(β−1).
Then if µs(β − 1) ≤ µα + c, the unique equilibrium is the U equilibrium.
If µα+c ∈ [µs{pc(σ
σ −1)+(1−pc)(β −1)},µs(β −1)], we have two asymmetric equilibria.
19There is a similarity here with the celebrated ‘Hawk-Dove’ game.
17If µs{pc(σ
σ − 1) + (1 − pc)(β − 1)} ≥ µα + c, the unique equilibrium is the C equilibrium.
Proof. See Section 7.
We now move to the analysis of the general model, with N ≥ 3. As in the analysis above,
we ﬁnd that symmetric as well as asymmetric equilibria can exist. The most important diﬀerence
in the general model is that strategic complementarities in information acquisition may exist with
more than 2 banks.
3 Analysis of the general model
The ﬁrst subsection examines optimal decisions and payoﬀ functions in the second period, taking
period 1 actions as given. The following subsection studies the ﬁrst period game. We then use the
results derived in this section to investigate equilibrium in the economy.
3.1 The second period
Note ﬁrst that Claim 1 established above continues to hold. Borrowers who did not get a loan in
period 1, or those who did but have L projects will not get outside loan oﬀers in period 2. Borrowers
who got a loan and have a H project will not get any outside loan oﬀer if all non-lending banks
receive a L signal from her. We now introduce some terminology. Consider a bank j. Suppose a
borrower from its local market with a H project received a loan in period 1. Suppose she is oﬀered
a loan in period 2 by a bank which does not know her type. Such a bank is termed an uninformed
bank. Clearly, all uninformed banks which make her an oﬀer will make her the same oﬀer. The
interest factor on such oﬀers is termed the period 2 outside interest factor, and is denoted by rj.
If the context is clear, we will drop the subscript j. r is taken as exogenous for now. We assume
feasibility, i.e., r ≤ Y , and consistency, i.e., r ≥ 1
σi, for any type i receiving a loan in period 1.
As argued above, if at least one non-lending bank receives signal H for a borrower at the
beginning of period 2, she will receive an outside contract oﬀer. However, the terms of the oﬀer
will depend on the identity of the oﬀering bank. Consider borrower E of type i who received a loan
in period 1, and has a H project. Let l be E’s local bank. There are two possibilities: either E
received a loan in 1 from l, or she received a loan from some other bank j.
18If E took a loan from l in period 1, any outside oﬀer she receives in period 2 will necessarily be
from an uninformed bank at the period 2 outside interest factor r. However, if she took a period 1
loan from some other bank j, she could receive a period 2 oﬀer from l, at interest factor 1
σi,o rs h e
could receive at least one outside oﬀer from an uninformed bank without receiving an oﬀer from l.
The following lemma derives the probabilities with which she receives these diﬀerent oﬀers.
Lemma 1 Let the signal quality of any bank j be pj. Suppose a borrower E has a H project. If E
r e c e i v e dal o a ni np e r i o d1f r o ml, her local bank, the probability she receives at least one outside
oﬀer in period 2 is πl =1−
Y
j6=l
(1 − pj).I fs h er e c e i v e dal o a ni np e r i o d1f r o ms o m eo t h e rb a n kj,
the probability she receives at least one outside oﬀer in period 2 from an uninformed bank without
receiving an oﬀer from l is
πu













while the probability she receives a period 2 outside oﬀer from l is
πl













Proof. See Section 7.
We now derive the payoﬀs in period 2 to banks and borrowers under these alternative events.
Without loss of generality, consider borrowers who received a loan in period 1 and have H projects.
What are the period 2 payoﬀs accruing to such a borrower and her lending bank from the relation-
ship? Assume she accepts the contract from her lending bank in the event of indiﬀerence. Let − → p
be the vector (p1,..,p j,..,p N).
First suppose E receives a loan from l in period 1. Any outside oﬀer she receives in period 2
is necessarily from an uninformed bank. The interest factor on such an oﬀer is r. The probability
she receives an outside oﬀer in period 2 is πl, by Lemma 1. Since l has superior information about
E, the respective payoﬀsa r e
Pb
2,i(− → p )=πl(βi − σir) (15)
Pl
2,i(− → p )=πl(σir − 1) + (1 − πl)(βi − 1) (16)
19Now suppose she receives a period 1 loan from some other bank j. With probability 1−πu
o −πl
o,
she does not receive an outside oﬀer, in which case j is a monopolist and extracts all rents from
her. Suppose she receives an outside oﬀer from l (the probability of receiving such an oﬀer is πl
o).
Since l makes her an oﬀer if and only if it receives the signal H, l and j are then symmetrically
informed about E.T h e r e f o r e ,j must break even from lending to her, while she gets the entire net
output from the project. Finally, suppose she receives outside oﬀers only from uninformed banks
(the probability of which is πu
o). j is now superiorly informed about E compared to any such bank.
E and j therefore have payoﬀs βi − σir,a n dσir − 1 respectively. We have
Pb
2,i(− → p )=πl
o(βi − 1) + πu
o(βi − σir) (17)
P
j
2,i(− → p )=πu
o(σir − 1) + (1 − πu
o − πl
o)(βi − 1) (18)
Summing up the discussion, if a borrower receives a loan in period 1, and has a H project,
she may face monopoly exploitation if information about the quality of her project is not correctly
received by outside lenders. If outside banks receive the signal L for her project, they will not oﬀer
her a contract, even though they know their perception is wrong with positive probability. Her
prior lending bank can then extract monopoly rents because it can diﬀerentiate between projects
of diﬀering quality while outsiders cannot. Even if outside banks do oﬀer her contracts in period 2,
some rents may accrue to her prior lending bank because of its superior information. A borrower
may also earn the entire net product of the project in period 2. This outcome obtains if she receives
a period 1 loan some bank j diﬀerent from her local bank l. Then, if l oﬀers her a contract in
period 2, competition takes away all rents from j, because of the informational symmetry between
l and j at this stage.
3.2 The ﬁrst period
We now use the results of the previous section to analyze the game in the ﬁrst period. We derive
optimal actions and payoﬀs taking investment decisions as given.
Suppose E receives at least one outside contract oﬀer, and let her best outside oﬀer (from some
bank C)g i v eh e rap a y o ﬀ v0. C has to break even in expected terms from the contract it oﬀers
E.W eﬁrst derive payoﬀs under the assumption that she receives at least one outside oﬀer at the
20beginning of period 1. Later, we examine bank actions when local market borrowers receive no
outside oﬀers.
A sb e f o r e ,l e tt h es i g n a lq u a l i t yo fa n yb a n kj be pj and let − → p =( p1,..,p j,..,p N).W ee s c h e w
a detailed analysis and note that the discussion parallels the arguments of Section 3.1. Therefore,
if E receives at least one outside contract oﬀer in period 1, her payoﬀ, i.e.,h e ro u t s i d eo p t i o ni s ,
from (17)
v0(− → p )=s(β − 1) − α (19)
Therefore, using (18), her local bank’s payoﬀ from her is
u(− → p )=0 (20)
On the other hand, suppose a bank’s local borrowers have no outside oﬀe r si np e r i o d1 ,i.e.,
v0 =0 . Suppose the bank oﬀers a local borrower a loan contract in period 1 with interest factor
ρ = y. We then have, using (15) and (16)
v(− → p )=sπl(β − σr) (21)
u(− → p )=s{πl(σr − 1) + (1 − πl)(β − 1)} − α (22)
If the borrower has a H project, her lifetime net expected payoﬀ is given by (21) and is her
expected payoﬀ in period 2, provided she receives a period 1 loan from her local bank. The bank
extracts all rents from the borrower in period 1. Its lifetime net expected payoﬀ from her is then
(y − 1) in period 1, plus her expected payoﬀ in period 2, conditional on the borrower having a H
project.
In summary, since a bank’s borrowers cannot be diﬀerentiated in period 1, if borrowers from a
local market receive outside contracts in period 1, all such borrowers have to receive the same oﬀers.
If some bank’s local market borrowers do not receive outside oﬀers in period 1, it is a monopolist.
It then extracts all rents, leaving borrowers with 0 payoﬀ in period 1. Borrowers who are oﬀered
loans by the local bank then receive their period 2 payoﬀ, provided they have a H project. On
21the other hand, they may receive outside contract oﬀers in period 1. Such contracts have to leave
the oﬀering banks with 0 lifetime net expected payoﬀs. The local bank also then has to receive 0
proﬁts from lending to such borrowers.
Before describing equilibrium, deﬁne the indicator variable λj, as before, which takes the value
1 if borrowers of bank j receive at least one outside loan oﬀer in period 1, and 0 otherwise. In a
symmetric equilibrium, either the borrowers of a bank will receive period 1 outside loan oﬀers from
all non-local banks, or they will not receive any oﬀers at all. Deﬁne the set Ij to be the set of types
of local borrowers to whom bank j makes loan oﬀers in period 1. Ij = Ik,∀j,k, in equilibrium and
either Ij =[ i,i] or Ij is null. If Ij is not null, the period 2 outside interest factor rj.is 1
σ,w h i c h
satisﬁes feasibility and consistency as before. The following result gives λj as a function of − → p .
Lemma 2 Suppose Ij is non-null. Given − → p , λj =1⇔ s{πu
o(σ
σ − 1) + (1 − πu
o − πl
o)(β − 1)} ≥ α.
Proof. See Section 7.
Feasibility implies that the interest factor that allows the outside bank to break even must be
less than the ﬁrst period cash ﬂow. Recall πu
o and πl
o are uniquely determined by − → p (see Lemma
1). Therefore, given − → p , whether λj equals 1 or 0 is determined entirely by the parameters. We
also see that if y ≥ 1, α ≤ 0, and hence λj is always 1, since β>1,a n dσ>σ .
4 Equilibrium with N ≥ 3 banks
We use the results of the previous sections to establish the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in
this section. The next section studies symmetric equilibria in greater detail and investigates some
properties of equilibrium. The intuition for the existence of diﬀerent kinds of equilibria is similar
to that discussed in the 2 bank model. Equilibrium always exists, with U equilibrium existing if pc
is low or the cost of investment is high. A C equilibrium exists if c is low, provided pc is not too
low. In general, asymmetric equilibria exist for intermediate costs of investment.
Equilibrium is the N vector (p∗
j)N
j=1.W e ﬁrst deﬁne an n-equilibrium, 0 ≤ n ≤ N as an
equilibrium with n banks investing in information acquisition and N −n banks not investing. A 0-
equilibrium is then equivalent to a U equilibrium where no bank invests in information collection,
while an N-equilibrium is equivalent to a C equilibrium, with all banks investing. For ease of
22exposition, we assume that ex post expected information rents, which is a function of the degree of





We now show that a pure strategy equilibrium always exists. The following result completely
characterizes pure strategy equilibria in the N-bank model. We have
Proposition 2 A pure strategy equilibrium exists given Assumptions 1 and 2.
Proof. See Section 7.
To augment our understanding, Figures 1 and 2 draw on the proposition above to present a
graphical picture of how diﬀerent equilibria exist in diﬀerent parts of the parameter space. Figure
1c o n s i d e r st h ec a s eo fN =3 , while Figure 2 considers the case of N =4 . For the purpose of
drawing the ﬁgures, we put σ
σ = σ∗. The following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 1 In an n-equilibrium, 0 <n<N,t h ep a y o ﬀ to the investing banks is higher than the
payoﬀ to the non-investing banks.
Proof. See Section 7.
The logic is as before. In an asymmetric equilibrium, investing banks make monopoly rents
ex ante, while non-investing banks are forced to give their local borrowers the entire net expected
product of the projects. Investment precludes competitors from oﬀering period 1 loans to investing
banks’ local borrowers, and also acts as a commitment device to prevent some banks from investing
themselves. Investing banks have no incentive to deviate in spite of the positive cost of investment
because some banks are not investing which raises the rents earned on local borrowers ex post.F o r
non-investing banks, switching to an investment strategy is not proﬁtable because c is suﬃciently
high and because ex post rents on own borrowers are limited given that the presence of some
investing banks.
235 Symmetric equilibrium
We use the results derived so far to investigate symmetric pure strategy equilibria in this section.
The model predicts there may be multiple equilibria. We derive conditions under which multiple
symmetric equilibria exist. An interesting prediction of the general N-bank model, when N ≥ 3,i s
that there may be strategic complementarities in information acquisition. Recall from the discussion
in Proposition 1, strategic complementarities and hence multiple equilibria do not exist in the 2-
bank model.
T h ea r g u m e n ti sa sf o l l o w s . W h e nN ≥ 3, a bank j’s investment in information acquisition
tightens the ex ante payment constraints of all other banks l 6= j when they are bidding for j’s
borrowers in period 1. However, investment improves j’s ex post signal quality in general and thus
also tightens other banks’ l 6= j,k ex ante payment constraints when bidding for bank k’s borrowers
in period 1. For some parameter values, j’s action therefore can induce other banks to invest, which
in turn can raise j’s incentive to invest.
Notice, this argument does not work when there are only 2 banks in the economy. If j and
k are the two banks, investment by j tightens k’s ex ante payment constraint when bidding for
j’s borrowers in period 1. But since it does not improve k’s position by tightening j’s ex ante
payment constraint when bidding for k’s borrowers in period 1, strategic complementarities are not
generated.
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b) s(1 − pc)(β − 1) ≥ α
Proof. See Section 7.
We now study welfare when multiple symmetric equilibria exist. Let welfare be measured by the
sum of payoﬀs of all agents, banks and borrowers, in the economy. The following result shows that
welfare is strictly lower in a C equilibrium, i.e., when all banks invest in information collection.
The argument is simple. Since information on borrowers and projects are not known in period
1, all borrowers always get loans. In a C equilibrium however, banks also expend resources to
24acquire information. In the model, the only role information collection has is to augment market
power. Investment acts as commitment device: investing increases ex post competitiveness and
hence generates monopoly rents ex ante.I ti st h u sad e a d w e i g h tl o s so ns o c i e t y ,a r i s i n gf r o mt h e
presence of informational asymmetries. The banks are better oﬀ however: their payoﬀsa r eh i g h e r
in a C equilibrium than in a U equilibrium. Interestingly, compared to a U equilibrium, a C
equilibrium has lower welfare and borrower payoﬀ even though ex post competition as measured
by the expected number of oﬀers received by any borrower is higher.
Proposition 4 Suppose a C equilibrium and a U equilibrium exist simultaneously. Relative to a U
equilibrium, a C equilibrium has lower welfare, higher payoﬀ for banks, lower payoﬀ for borrowers,
and higher ex post competition as measured by the expected number of oﬀers received by borrowers
with H projects in period 2.
Proof. See Section 7.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Optimal allocation of investment funds is contingent on the appropriate evaluation of credit risk. By
being central to the determination and rating of creditworthiness, eﬃcient information acquisition
is critical to the proper functioning of credit markets. Existing literature has suggested that the
nature of information as a ‘soft’ good over which property rights are diﬃcult to deﬁne or enforce
acts as an impediment to information production. Competition then diminishes the incentives for
information collection. Furthermore, since privileged information is obtained through the process
of lending, banks will never invest in gathering information on ﬁrms seeking funds for project
reﬁnancing.
This paper has shown that there may be other strategic dimensions to information acquisition.
With informationally heterogeneous banks, investment in information acquisition acts as a com-
mitment device. By reducing competitors’ ex post rents, banks lower the level of competition faced
ex ante. If the reduction in competition is suﬃciently large, banks may obtain monopoly rents.
The incentive to invest in information collection then depends on the trade-oﬀ between increased
payoﬀs stemming from limited competition and the cost of investment. If the cost is suﬃciently
low, and investment is suﬃciently productive, the unique equilibrium has all banks investing in
25information acquisition. By contrast, if the cost is suﬃciently high, and investment is suﬃciently
unproductive, the no bank invests in information acquisition.
Asymmetric equilibria exist with intermediate costs of investment: in such an equilibrium,
investing banks obtain higher payoﬀ than non-investing banks. The analysis also shows that with
more than two banks, information acquisition is characterized by strategic complementarities. Thus,
multiple equilibria may exist. Banks invest in information acquisition to augment market power
and limit competition; information collection therefore represents a dead-weight loss and leads to
reduced welfare. Since more information becomes available about borrowers ex post,i n c r e a s e d
competition for continuing projects may actually signal higher market power for banks.
The results of the paper have implications for deregulation policy. Welfare is reduced because
of the exercise of market power by informationally superior banks through the use of strategic
commitment. Competitors cannot break even from period 1 oﬀers because reduced period 2 rents
cannot compensate for the losses borne ex ante. In the absence of enforceability of long-term con-
tracts, welfare could be augmented by imposing ‘no-reﬁnancing’ penalties on borrowers. Borrowers
then face switching costs of moving to another lender in period 2. Since incumbent lenders are
therefore able to extract higher ex post rents, their ability to subsidize period 1 losses is enhanced.
Penalties thus weaken the commitment value of information acquisition. Borrowers get the same
lifetime payoﬀs however, as competition ensures they get the entire net expected output from their
projects.
The commitment value of information acquisition is generated by the asymmetries in banks’
abilities to gather private information ex post and the incompleteness of public information. In this
context, regulatory changes designed to increase information acquisition through heightened use
of public credit rating information, as envisioned in the Basel Accord (see BIS (2000)), may have
negative consequences. The results of this paper suggest that such a policy should be complemented
with one designed to minimize the discrepancy between public and private information.
Although the discussion has been framed with reference to credit markets, the arguments ex-
tend to more general contexts. Suppose privileged information arises in the course of a relationship
and vendors are informationally heterogeneous. Investment in information acquisition limits asym-
metries of information and therefore competitors’ rents ex post. By tightening competitors’ ex
ante break even constraints, competition is inhibited. Under some circumstances, market power is
substantially augmented, and monopoly rents may be obtained. Such issues may be important in
merchant banking, insurance, human capital, housing and other markets.
26Several directions for further research could be pursued. In the model, all banks are symmetri-
cally uninformed ex ante. With asymmetries, strategic information manipulation becomes an issue.
Observation of each bank’s behavior then becomes a conditioning variable ex post, with implica-
tions for portfolio risk, volume of lending and social welfare. The issue of entrepreneurial incentives
could also be studied. Information acquisition increases competition ex post, while reducing it ex
ante. The impact on incentives then depends on the relative productivity of the project in the ﬁrst
vis-à-vis the second period. In imperfectly competitive economies, the nature of surplus sharing
between banks and borrowers will also inﬂuence the impact of information acquisition on incentives,
and thereby on social welfare. These questions are left for future research.
7P r o o f s
P r o o fo fC l a i m2 . Suppose λl =1 ,f o rs o m el. Let the best period 1 outside oﬀer faced by l’s
local borrowers be ρ0l.S i n c e λl =1 , ρ0l must satisfy feasibility, i.e., ρ0l ≤ y. Applying (10), we
have
ρ0l(pj,p k)=1 − s(1 − pl)(β − 1) ≤ y
or, α ≤ s(1 − pl)(β − 1)
For the converse, suppose α ≤ s(1 − pl)(β − 1). Then, a loan oﬀer ρ0 =1− s(1 − pl)(β − 1)
is feasible. Making such an oﬀer allows the outside bank to break even, and makes borrowers
indiﬀerent between this and their local bank’s oﬀer.
Proof of Proposition 1. We ﬁrst look at asymmetric equilibria. First of all, we note that
since s(β−1)−α>0, β>σ
σ. Suppose j invests while k does not. Consider j’s payoﬀs ﬁrst. Deﬁne
λa
li as the value of the indicator variable for bank l, l = j,k in an asymmetric equilibrium when l’s
action is i, i = u,c, given that bank l conforms to its prescribed action. i = u indicates the bank
does not acquire information, while i = c indicates the bank collects information. Also deﬁne λad
li
as the value of the indicator variable for bank l, l = j,k in an asymmetric equilibrium when l’s




li are deﬁned similarly.
In equilibrium, if λa
jc =1 , the payoﬀ is −c, by (12). Otherwise, by (14), the payoﬀ is
27µs(β − 1) − µα − c
By Claim 2,
λa
jc =1⇔ s(1 − pc)(β − 1) ≥ α
Suppose j deviates. Then, if λad
jc =1 , the payoﬀ is 0. Otherwise, the payoﬀ is
µ{s(β − 1) − α}
Finally,
λad
jc =1⇔ s(β − 1) ≥ α, which is always true.




jc =1 .C l e a r l y ,j deviates if both λa
jc
and λad
jc equal 1 or if they both equal 0. Suppose therefore λad
jc =1 ,a n dλa
jc =0 . In other words,
suppose pc > 1 − α
s(β−1). Then, j does not deviate if and only if
µs(β − 1) − µα − c ≥ 0
Next, consider k’s payoﬀs. In equilibrium, if λa




− 1) + (1 − pc)(β − 1)] − µα
By Assumption 1 and Claim 2, λa
ku is always 1 as s(β−1) >α . Now suppose k deviates. Then,
if λad




− 1) + (1 − pc)(β − 1)] − µα − c
Finally,
λad
ku =1⇔ s(1 − pc)(β − 1) ≥ α
By the earlier logic, k does not deviate if both λa
ku and λad
ku equal 1 or if they both equal 0.
Suppose therefore λad
ku =0 ,a n dλa
ku =1 . In other words, suppose pc > 1− α
s(β−1). Then, k deviates




− 1) + (1 − pc)(β − 1)] − µα − c>0
Therefore, given j invests, k does not invest if and only if
a) pc ≤ 1 −
α
s(β − 1)
or c) pc > 1 −
α
s(β − 1)
and µα + c ≥ µs[pc(
σ
σ
− 1) + (1 − pc)(β − 1)]
Therefore, asymmetric equilibria exist if and only if
pc > 1 −
α
s(β − 1)
and µα + c ∈ [µs{pc(
σ
σ
− 1) + (1 − pc)(β − 1)},µs(β − 1)]
We now look at the existence of the C equilibrium. Suppose both banks invest. Then, for any
bank l, in equilibrium, if λc




− 1) + (1 − pc)(β − 1)] − µα − c
Moreover, using Claim 2
λc
l =1⇔ s(1 − pc)(β − 1) ≥ α
Suppose bank l deviates. Then, if λcd




− 1) + (1 − pc)(β − 1)] − µα
Finally, λcd





l =1 . Suppose therefore λcd
l =1 ,a n dλc
l =0 . In other words, suppose pc > 1 − α
s(β−1).T h e na




− 1) + (1 − pc)(β − 1)] ≥ µα + c
Finally, we study the U equilibrium. Suppose neither bank invests. Then, for any bank l,i n
equilibrium, if λu
l =1 , the payoﬀ is 0, by (12). Otherwise, using (14), the payoﬀ is
29µ{s(β − 1) − α}
Moreover, λu
l =1 , by Assumption 1. Suppose bank l deviates and collects information. Then,
if λud
l =1 , the payoﬀ is −c. Otherwise, the payoﬀ is
µs(β − 1) − µα − c
Finally,
λud
l =1⇔ s(1 − pc)(β − 1) ≥ α
Since c is positive, no deviation occurs if λu
l = λud
l =1 ,o ri fλu
l = λud





l =0 . Suppose therefore λud
l =0and λu
l =1 . In other words, suppose
pc > 1 − α
s(β−1).T h e naU equilibrium does not exist if and only if µs(β − 1) >µ α+ c.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . First suppose E received a loan in period 1 from l. I np e r i o d2
uninformed banks receive signals about her project quality. She will not receive an outside contract










(1 − pj), 20










(1 − pm)],0 ≤ M<N− 1




30Now suppose she received a loan in period 1 from some other bank j.D e ﬁne the three following
events: A - l receives a signal H, B - l receives a signal L, as do all other non-lending banks, and
C - l receives a signal L, while at least one other non-lending bank receives a signal H.








In order for event C to occur, it must be the case that l draws signal L. In addition at least
one of the other non-lending banks must draw signal H. The probability that exactly M of the










(1 − pm)},0 <M<N− 1
Therefore, the probability that E receives at least one outside oﬀer in period 2 from an unin-
formed bank without receiving an oﬀer from l is
πu













Finally, the probability that E receives an oﬀer from l is the residual. Therefore,
πl
o =1 − πu


















P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . Suppose λj =1 ,f o rs o m ej. Let the best period 1 outside oﬀer faced
by j’s local borrowers be ρ0j.S i n c eλj =1 , ρ0j must satisfy feasibility, i.e., ρ0j ≤ y. Dropping the
subscript j, and applying (10), we have




− 1) + (1 − πu
o − πl
o)(β − 1)} ≤ y




− 1) + (1 − πu
o − πl
o)(β − 1)}
31For the converse, suppose α ≤ s{πu
o(σ
σ − 1) + (1 − πu
o − πl
o)(β − 1)}. Then, a loan oﬀer
ρ0 =1− s{πu
o(σ
σ − 1) + (1 − πu
o − πl
o)(β − 1)} is feasible. Making such an oﬀer allows the outside
bank to break even, and makes borrowers indiﬀerent between this and their local bank’s oﬀer.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . Deﬁne λn
li as the value of the indicator variable for bank l, l = j,k
in an n-equilibrium when l’s action is i, i = u,c, given that bank l conforms to its prescribed
action. i = u indicates the bank does not acquire information, while i = c indicates the bank
collects information. Also deﬁne λnd
li as the value of the indicator variable for bank l, l = j,k in an
n-equilibrium when l’s action is i, i = u,c, given that bank l deviates.
Notice, whenever an n-equilibrium exists, with n banks investing and N − n not investing, we
also have NCn − 1 other equivalent equilibria because of the symmetry across banks. We ignore
such multiplicity in the following discussion. Also, the U equilibrium and the C equilibrium are
unique in the sense described here as NC0 =N CN =1 .
We use Lemmata 1 and 2, and equations (20) and (22) to derive payoﬀ functions. First consider
a U equilibrium. Consider an arbitrary bank l. In equilibrium, πl = πu
o =0 ,a n d1 − πu
o − πl
o =1 .
Therefore, its payoﬀ is 0 if λ0
lu =1 , and, by Assumption 1, λ0
lu =1 .
If l deviates, πl = πu
o =0 ,a n d1 − πu
o − πl
o =1− pc.A l s o i t s p a y o ﬀ is −c if λ0d
lu =1 ,a n d
µs(β − 1) − µα − c if λ0d
lu =0 .W eh a v eλ0d
lu =1⇔ s(1 − pc)(β − 1) ≥ α.
Clearly then, if λ0
lu = λ0d
lu = m, m =0 ,1, l does not deviate. Let λ0
lu =1and λ0d
lu =0 , i.e.,l e t
pc > 1 −
α
s(β − 1)
Then, l conforms if and only if
µα + c ≥ µs(β − 1)
Therefore a U equilibrium exists if and only if a) pc ≤ 1 − α
s[(σ
σ−1)+(β−σ




σ)] and (ii) µα + c ≥ µs[(σ
σ − 1) + (β − σ
σ)].
We now consider a 1-equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium where only 1 bank invests, while the
others do not. Consider an arbitrary non-investing bank l.W eh a v eπl = pc. Now consider oﬀers
received by l’s local borrowers in period 1. Oﬀers could come from other non-investing banks, with
all such oﬀers identical to each other. An oﬀer could also come from the investing bank. Since all
period 1 oﬀers leave the borrowers with the same payoﬀ s(β −1)−α, entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent
amongst outside oﬀers, irrespective of the investment decision of the oﬀering bank. However such
32an oﬀer, if accepted, leaves an investing bank with higher rents ex post, when compared to an
accepted oﬀer made by a non-investing bank as pc > 0.T h e ex ante p a y m e n tc o n s t r a i n to fa
non-investing bank is then tighter. Thus, if a non-investing bank ﬁnds it feasible to make an oﬀer,
so does the investing bank. Hence, without loss of generality, consider an oﬀer from the investing
bank.
In equilibrium therefore, πu
o =0 ,a n d1−πu
o −πl
o =1 .I t sp a y o ﬀ is 0 if λ1
lu =1 . By Assumption
1, λ1
lu is always 1. If l deviates, πu
o =0 ,a n d1 − πu
o − πl
o =1− pc.A l s oi t sp a y o ﬀ is −c if λ1d
lu =1 ,
and µs[pc(σ
σ − 1) + (1 − pc)(β − 1)] − µα − c if λ1d
lu =0 .W eh a v eλ1d
lu =1⇔ s(1 − pc)(β − 1) ≥ α.
Clearly, l conforms if λ1d
lu =1 . Therefore, let λ1
lu =1and λ1d
lu =0 . Then,
pc > 1 −
α
s(β − 1)
Then, l conforms if and only if
µα + c ≥ µs[pc(
σ
σ
− 1) + (1 − pc)(β − 1)]
Now consider the investing bank l0. In equilibrium, πl0 = πu
o =0 ,a n d1 − πu
o − πl0
o =1− pc.
Moreover, its payoﬀ is −c if λ1
l0c =1and µs(β −1)−µα−c if λ1
l0c =0 . Finally, λ1
l0c =1if and only
if s(1 − pc)(β − 1) ≥ α.
If l0 deviates, πl0 = πu
o =0 ,a n d1 − πu
o − πl0
o =1 .I t sp a y o ﬀ is 0 if λ1d
l0c =1and µs(β − 1) − µα
if λ1d
l0c =0 .A l s o ,λ1d





l0c =1 .W eh a v e ,
pc > 1 −
α
s(β − 1)
l0 invests if and only if
µα + c ≤ µs(β − 1)
Collecting together the results then, a 1-equilibrium exists if and only if
a) pc > 1 −
α
s[(σ
σ − 1) + (β − σ
σ)]
and
b) µα + c ∈ [µs[(
σ
σ










33Now consider an arbitrary n-equilibrium, with 2 ≤ n<N .L e t l and l0 be representative
non-investing and investing banks respectively. Consider l’s decision to deviate. πl =1−(1−pc)n.

















c (1 − pc)n−1−M} and
1 − πu
o − πl
o =( 1 − pc)n−1
If λn
lu =1 ,i t sp a y o ﬀ is 0, while its payoﬀ is µs[{1 − (1 − pc)n}(σ
σ − 1) + (1 − pc)n(β − 1)] − µα
if λn






c (1 − pc)n−1−M}}(
σ
σ
− 1) + (1 − pc)n−1(β − 1)] ≥ α
On the other hand, if l deviates,
πu




c (1 − pc)n−1−M} and
1 − πu
o − πl
o =( 1 − pc)n
If λnd
lu =1 ,i t sp a y o ﬀ is −c, while its payoﬀ is µs[{1−(1−pc)n}(σ
σ −1)+(1−pc)n(β−1)]−µα−c
if λnd
lu =0 .W eh a v e
λnd




c (1 − pc)n−1−M}}(
σ
σ
− 1) + (1 − pc)n−1(β − 1)] ≥ α
Since λn
lu = λnd
lu implies that l does not deviate, let λnd
lu =0and λn
lu =1 .W eh a v e






c (1 − pc)n−1−M}}(σ
σ − 1) + (1 − pc)n−1(β − 1)]
i.e., pc > 1 −
α
s[(σ
σ − 1) + (1 − pc)n−1(β − σ
σ)]
Then, l conforms if and only if
µα + c ≥ µs[{1 − (1 − pc)n}(
σ
σ
− 1) + (1 − pc)n(β − 1)]
Now consider l0’s decision to invest. πl =1− (1 − pc)n−1.W eh a v e
πu




c (1 − pc)n−2−M} and
1 − πu
o − πl
o =( 1 − pc)n−1
If λn
l0c =1 ,i t sp a y o ﬀ is −c,w h i l ei t sp a y o ﬀ is µs[{1−(1−pc)n−1}(σ
σ−1)+(1−pc)n−1(β−1)]−µα−c
if λn
l0c =0 .W eh a v e
λn




c (1 − pc)n−2−M}}(
σ
σ







c (1 − pc)n−2−M} and
1 − πu
o − πl
o =( 1 − pc)n−2
If λnd
l0c =1 ,i t sp a y o ﬀ is 0, while its payoﬀ is µs[{1−(1−pc)n−1}(σ
σ −1)+(1−pc)n−1(β−1)]−µα
if λnd






c (1 − pc)n−2−M}}(
σ
σ
− 1) + (1 − pc)n−2(β − 1)] ≥ α
Since λn
l0c = λnd
l0c implies that l does not deviate, let λnd
l0c =1and λn
l0c =0 .W eh a v e
pc > 1 −
α
s[(σ
σ − 1) + (1 − pc)n−2(β − σ
σ)]
35Then, l0 invests if and only if
µα + c ≤ µs[{1 − (1 − pc)n−1}(
σ
σ
− 1) + (1 − pc)n−1(β − 1)]
Therefore, an n-equilibrium exists if and only if
a) pc > 1 −
α
s[(σ
σ − 1) + (1 − pc)n−2(β − σ
σ)]
and
b) µα + c ∈ [µs[(
σ
σ










We note that s[(σ
σ −1)+(1−pc)m(β− σ




functions of m,w h e r em is a positive integer.
We ﬁnally turn to the C equilibrium. Consider an arbitrary bank l. πl =1− (1 − pc)N−1.I n
equilibrium,
πu




c (1 − pc)N−2−M} and
1 − πu
o − πl
o =( 1 − pc)N−1
Therefore, its payoﬀ is −c if λN
lc =1 , and, µs[{1−(1−pc)N−1}(σ
σ−1)+(1−pc)N−1(β−1)]−µα−c
if λN
lc =0 .W eh a v e
λN




c (1 − pc)N−2−M}}(
σ
σ







c (1 − pc)N−2−M} and
1 − πu
o − πl
o =( 1 − pc)N−2
Also its payoﬀ is 0 if λNd
lc =1 ,a n dµs[{1 − (1 − pc)N−1}(σ
σ − 1) + (1 − pc)N−1(β − 1)] − µα if
λNd






c (1 − pc)N−2−M}}(
σ
σ
− 1) + (1 − pc)N−2(β − 1)] ≥ α
36It is easy to see then that a C equilibrium exists if and only if
a) pc > 1 −
α
s[(σ
σ − 1) + (1 − pc)N−2(β − σ
σ)]
and
b) µα + c ≤ µs[(
σ
σ




Collecting together the results, we see that a pure strategy equilibrium exists always.
Proof of Corollary 1. Consider an n-equilibrium, 0 <n<N. For an arbitrary non-investing
bank l, λn
lu =1 , while for an arbitrary investing bank l0, λn
l0c =0 . Therefore l’s payoﬀ is 0, while
l0’s payoﬀ is µs[{1 − (1 − pc)n−1}(σ
σ − 1) + (1 − pc)n−1(β − 1)] − µα − c ≥ 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . From Proposition 2, a C equilibrium exists if and only if
a) pc > 1 −
α
s[(σ
σ − 1) + (1 − pc)N−2(β − σ
σ)]
and
b) µα + c ≤ µs[(
σ
σ




(a) is equivalent to µs[(σ
σ −1)+(1−pc)N−1(β − σ
σ)] <µ α+µspc(σ
σ −1), while (b) is equivalent
to µs[(σ
σ − 1) + (1 − pc)N−1(β − σ
σ)] ≥ µα + c.
Consider a U equilibrium. From Proposition 2, a U equilibrium exists if and only if








(ii) µα + c ≥ µs(β − 1)
If pc > 1 − α
s(β−1),aU equilibrium exists if and only if µs(β − 1) ≤ µα + c.S i n c es(β − 1) >
s[(σ
σ − 1) + (1 − pc)N−1(β − σ
σ)],w ef o c u so npc ≤ 1 − α
s(β−1), without loss of generality. Now,
pc ≤ 1 − α
s(β−1) is equivalent to s(1 − pc)(β − 1) ≥ α.




− 1) + (1 − pc)N−1(β −
σ
σ







b) s(1 − pc)(β − 1) ≥ α





− 1) + (1 − pc)N−1(β −
σ
σ
)] − µα − c ≥ 0
while the payoﬀ of each bank in a U equilibrium is 0. Using (19), total welfare in a U equilibrium




− 1) + (1 − pc)N−1(β −
σ
σ




= M[s(β − 1) − α] − Nc
Therefore, welfare and borrower payoﬀs are lower, while bank payoﬀsa r eh i g h e r ,i naC equi-
librium when compared to a U equilibrium.
We now turn to ex post competition. Consider a borrower with a H project from bank l’s local
market. From Lemma 1, the probability she receives N − 1 oﬀers in period 2 is
Y
k6=l
pk,w h i l et h e










Therefore, her expected number of oﬀers in period 2, conditional on her project being H is 0 in








c (1 − pc)N−1−M +( N − 1)pN−1
c




c (1 − pc)N−2−K}]+( N − 1)pN−1
c
=( N − 1)pc(1 − pN−2
c )+( N − 1)pN−1
c =( N − 1)pc > 0
Therefore, a C equilibrium has higher ex post competition than a U equilibrium.
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The numbers and letters in the graph refer to the type of equilibrium. For example, (C, U) means that in the relevant zone, both C and U
are equilibria. 
Figure 1:





















The numbers and letters in the graph refer to the type of equilibrium. For example, (3, U) means that in the relevant zone, both n=3 and 
U are equilibria. 
Figure 2:
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